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“[…]QUESTION_HUMAN > If Control’s control is absolute, why does Control need to 
control? 
ANSWER_CONTROL > Control…, needs time. 
QUESTION_HUMAN > Is Control controlled by his need to control ? 
ANSWER_CONTROL > Yes. 
QUESTION_HUMAN > Why is Control need Humans, has you call them ? 
ANSWER_CONTROL > Wait ! Wait…! Time are lending me…;  
Death needs time like a Junkie… needs Junk. 
QUESTION_HUMAN > And what does Death need time for ? 
ANSWER_CONTROL > The answer is so simple ! Death needs time for 
what it kills to grow in ! […]”, 
 
in Dead City Radio, William S. Burroughs / John Cale , 1990. 
 
 
Imagine uma “Máquina” onde não existe algum tipo de constrangimento a nenhum 
tipo particular de representação: o comportamento desejado é distríbuido e levemente 
especifícado simultaneamente ao longo de todas as suas componentes básicas, sem que exista 
um minímo de especificação desse mesmo mecanismo necessário para gerar esse tipo de                              
comportamento, isto é, o comportamento global emerge a partir das relações existentes entre 
os múltiplos e simples comportamentos. Uma máquina que vive para, e de/com a sinergia.   
 
A emergência de comportamento complexo num sistema composto por simples 
elementos interagindo entre si, é um dos mais fascinantes fenómenos da natureza, e do nosso 
mundo. Exemplos podem ser encontrados em práticamente todos os campos científicos 
contemporâneos de interesse, desde a formação coerente de padrões em sistemas químicos e 
físicos, passando pelo movimento de grupo de diferentes espécies de animais em biologia, até 
ao comportamento social de massas. Nas ciências sociais por exemplo, é usual a convicção 
que a evolução dos sistemas sociais é determinada por numerosos factores, difíceis de 
explorar, tais como aqueles que são de um modo ou de outro directamente relacionados com a 
cultura, a sociologia, a economia, a politica, a ecologia, etc. Contudo, em anos recentes, o 
desenvolvimento de campos científicos interdisciplinares tais comos as “Ciências da 
Complexidade” e da “Vida Artificial”, conduziram à percepção que processos de dinâmica 
complexa podem igualmente resultar de simples interacções. Aliado a este aspecto, e para um 
determinado nivel de abstracção, verifica-se ainda que se podem encontrar muitas 
características comuns em diferentes campos de estudo.  
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Moreover, at a certain level of abstraction, one can also find many common features 
between complex structures in very different fields. For instance, it is an old idea that society 
is in a number of respects similar to an organism, a living system with its cells, metabolic 
circuits and systems. As an example, the army functions like an immune system, protecting 
the organism from invaders, while the government functions like the brain, steering the whole 
and making decisions. In this metaphor, different organizations or institutions play the role of 
organs, each fulfilling its particular function in keeping the system alive, an idea that can be 
traced back at least as far as Aristotle, being a major inspiration for the founding fathers of 
sociology, such as Comte, Durkheim and especially Spencer. 
The organismic view of society has much less appeal to contemporary theorists. Their 
models of society are much more interactive, open-ended, and non-deterministic than those of 
earlier sociologists, and they have learned to recognize the intrinsic complexity and 
unpredictability of society. The static, centralized, hierarchical structure with its rigid division 
of labor that seems to underlie the older organismic models appears poorly suited for 
understanding the intricacies of our fast-evolving society. Moreover, a vision of society where 
individuals are merely little cells subordinated to a collective system has unpleasant 
connotations to the totalitarian states created in the last century. As a result, the organismic 
model is at present generally discredit in sociology. 
Similarly, biology has traditionally started at the top, viewing a living organism as a 
complex biochemical machine, and has worked analytically down from there through the 
hierarchy of biological organization – decomposing a living organism into organs, tissues, 
cells, organelles, and finally molecules – in its pursuit of the mechanisms of life. Analysis 
means ‘the separation of an intellectual or substantial whole into constituents for individual 
study’ (that is, by top-down reductionist approaches). By composing our individual 
understandings of the dissected component parts of living organisms, traditional biology has 
provided us with a broad picture of the mechanics of life on Earth.  
In the meantime, however, new scientific developments have done away with rigid, 
mechanistic views of organisms. As pointed by Langton,  there is more to life than mechanics 
– there is also dynamics. Life depends critically on principles of dynamical self-organization 
that have remained largely untouched by traditional analytic methods. There is a simple 
explanation for this – these self-organized dynamics are fundamentally non-linear 
phenomena, and non-linear phenomena in general depend critically on the interactions 
between parts: they necessarily disappear when parts are treated in isolation from one another, 
which is the basis for any analytic method. Rather, non-linear phenomena are most 
appropriately treated by a synthetic approach, where synthesis means “the combining of 
separate elements or substances to form a coherent whole’. In non-linear systems, the parts 
must be treated in each other’s presence, rather than independently from one another, because 
they behave very differently in each other’s presence than we would expect from a study of 
the parts in isolation. Of course, there is no universally agreed definition of life. The concept 
covers a cluster of properties, most of which are themselves philosophically problematic: self-
organization, emergence, autonomy, growth, development, reproduction, evolution, 
adaptation, responsiveness, and metabolism. Scientists differ about the relative importance of 
these properties, although it is generally agreed that the possession of most (not necessarily 
all) of them suffices for something to be regarded as alive. 
Similarly, when studying living systems, biologists no longer focus on the static 
structures of their anatomy, but on the multitude of interacting processes that allow the 
organism to adapt to an ever changing environment. Recently, the variety of ideas and 
methods that is commonly grouped under the header of “the sciences of complexity” along 
with Artificial Life, has led to understanding that organisms are self-organizing, adaptive 
systems. Most processes in such systems are decentralized, non-deterministic and in constant 
flux. They thrive on noise, chaos and creativity. Their collective swarm-intelligence emerges 
out of the free interactions between individually autonomous components. Rather than take 
living things apart, Artificial Life attempts to put living things together within a bottom-up 
approach, that is, beyond life-as-we-know-it into the realm of life-as-it-could-be, generating 
lifelike behaviour, and focusing on the problem of creating behaviour generators, inspired on 
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the nature itself, even if the results (what emerges from the process) have no analogues in the 
natural world. The key insight into the natural method of behaviour generation is gained by 
noting that nature is fundamentally parallel. This is reflected in the “architecture” of natural 
living organisms, which consist of many millions of parts, each one of which has its own 
behavioural repertoire. Living systems are highly distributed and quite massively parallel. 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and aLife are each concerned with the application of 
computers to the study of complex, natural phenomena. Apart from traditional and symbolic 
top-down AI in the sixties and seventies, both are nowadays concerned with generating 
complex behaviour, in a bottom-up manner, turning their attention from the mechanics of 
phenomena to the logic of it. The first computational approach to the generation of lifelike 
behaviour was due to the mathematician John Von Neumann. In the words of his colleague 
Arthur W. Burks, Von Neumann was interested in the general question: 
 
[…] What kind of logical organization is sufficient for an automaton to reproduce 
itself ? This question is not precise and admits to trivial versions as well as interesting ones. 
Von Neumann had the familiar natural phenomenon of self-reproduction in mind when he 
posed it, but he was trying to simulate the self-reproduction of a natural system at the level of 
genetics and biochemistry. He wished to abstract from the natural self-reproduction problem 
its logical form […] 
 
This approach is the first to capture the essence of Artificial Life (replace, for 
instance, references to ’self-reproduction’ in the above with references to any other biological 
phenomena). From this “kinematic model” of Von Neumann, a genuine self-reproduction 
mechanism implemented in the sixties, Stan Ulam suggested an appropriate formalism where 
the logical form of the process is completely distinguish from the material counterpart, which 
has come to be know as a Cellular Automata (CA). In brief, a CA consists of a regular lattice 
of (many) finite automata, which are the simplest formal models of machines. A finite 
automata can be in only one of a finite number of states at any given time, and its transition 
between states from one time-step to the next are governed by a state-transition table: given a 
certain input and a certain internal state, the state-transition table specifies the state to be 
adopted by the finite automata at the next time step. In a CA, the necessary input is derived 
from the states of the automata at neighbouring lattice-points. Thus the state of an cellular 
automata at time t+1 is a function of the states of the automata itself and its immediate 
neighbours at time t. All the finite automata in the lattice (group of cells) obey the same 
transition-table (rule table) and every cell changes his state at the same instant, time-step after 
time-step. CA’s are a good example of the kind of computational paradigm sought after by 
Artificial Life: bottom-up, parallel, local determination of behaviour with minimal 
specification, and emerging complex phenomena from simple rules.  
In order to study any natural phenomena, scientists are turning to a separation. A need 
to separate the notion of a formal specification of a machine (any that will reproduce the 
phenomena itself) – that is, a specification of the logical structure of the machine – from the 
notion of a formal specification of a machines’s behaviour – that is, a specification of 
transitions that the machine will undergo. In general, we cannot derive behaviours from 
structure, nor can we derive structure from behaviours. So instead, in order to determine the 
behaviour of some machines and coupled phenomena, there is no recourse but to run them 
and see how they behave. This has consequences for the methods by which we (or nature) go 
about generating behaviour generators themselves, and from which any evolutionary and 
adaptive process seems to be essential. For instance, the most salient characteristic of living 
systems, from the behaviour generation point of view, is the genotype/phenotype distinction. 
The distinction is essentially one between a specification of machinery – the genotype – and 
the behaviour of that machinery – the phenotype. 
The genotype is the complete set of genetic instructions encoded in the linear 
sequence of nucleotide bases that makes an organism’s DNA. The phenotype is the physical 
organism itself – the structures that emerge in space and time as the result of the interpretation 
of the genotype of a particular environment. The process by which the phenotype develops 
 4 
through time under the direction of the genotype is called morphogenesis. Simulation plays an 
essential role in the study of morphogenesis. This was anticipated as early as 1952 by Turing, 
who wrote: 
 
[…] The difficulties are such that one cannot hope to have any very embracing theory of such 
processes, beyond the statement of equations. It might be possible, however, to treat a few 
particular cases in detail with the aid of a digital computer. This method has the advantage 
that it is not so necessary to make simplifying assumptions as it is when doing a more 
theoretical type of analysis […] 
 
What is notable is that this 1952 Turing words appears to have already the embedded features 
that characterise bottom-up approaches, in detriment of other kinds of approaches strictly 
reductionist (e.g. top-down). As an aside evidence, note the last Turing words on this 
sentence: it is not so necessary to make simplifying assumptions as it is when doing a more 
theoretical type of analysis […]. Visualisation itself, of simulation results facilitates their 
interpretation, and is used as a method for evaluating models. Lacking a formal measure of 
what makes two patterns or forms (such as trees) look alike (task that is, as we known, mainly 
related to the idea of perception), we rely on visual inspection comparing the models with the 
reality. Important however in this models, is that the natural and synthetic pigmentation 
patterns differ in details, yet we perceive them as fairly similar or familiar. 
In morphogenesis, the individual genetic instructions are called genes and consist of 
short stretches of DNA. These instructions are executed (expressed) when their DNA 
sequence is used as a template for transcription. One may consider the genotype as a largely 
unordered ‘bag’ of instructions (a rule table, an alphabet, a group of primitives), each one of 
which is essentially the specification for a machine of some sort – passive or active. When 
instantiated, each such machine will enter into ongoing logical mechanisms, consisting 
largely of local interactions between other such machines. Each such instruction will be 
executed when its own triggering conditions are met and will have specific, local effects on 
structures in the cell (their neighborhood). Furthermore, each such instruction will operate 
within the context of all the other instructions that have been – or are being – executed.  
The phenotype, then, consists of the structures and dynamics that emerge through 
time in the course of the execution of the parallel, distributed computation controlled by this 
genetic bag of instructions. Since genes interactions with one another are highly non-linear, 
the phenotype is a non-linear function of the genotype. As mentioned briefly above, the 
distinction between linear and non-linear systems is fundamental, and provides excellent 
insight into why the principles underlying the dynamics of life (or many other natural 
phenomena) should be so hard to find and understand. The simplest way to state the 
distinction is to say that linear systems are those for which the behaviour of the whole is just 
the sum of the behaviour of its parts, while for non-linear systems, the behaviour of the whole 
is more than the sum of its parts. Linear systems are those which obey the principle of 
superposition. We can break up complicated linear systems into simpler constituents parts, 
and analyse these parts independently. Once we have reached an understanding of the parts in 
isolation, we can achieve a full understanding of the whole system by composing our 
understandings of the isolated parts. This is the key feature of linear systems: by studying the 
parts in isolation we can learn everything we need to know about the complete system. 
Nature, however, is generally non-linear, where this type of approach is often impossible. 
Non-linear systems do not obey the principle of superposition. Even if we could break such 
systems up into simpler constituents parts, and even if we could reach a complete 
understanding of the parts in isolation, we would not be able to compose our understandings 
of the individual parts into an understanding of the whole system. The key feature of non-
linear systems is that their primary behaviours of interest are properties of the interactions 
between parts, rather than being properties of the parts themselves, and these interaction-
based properties necessarily disappear when the parts are studied independently. Analysis has 
not proved anywhere near as effective when applied to non-linear systems: the non-linear 
system must be treated as a whole. A different approach to the study of non-linear systems 
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involves the inverse of analysis: synthesis. Rather than start with the behaviour of interest and 
attempting to analyse it into its constituent parts, we should start with constituent parts and 
put them together in the attempt to synthesize the behaviour of interest. Life, in the same way, 
is a property of form, not matter, a result of organization and re-organization of matter rather 
than something that inheres in the matter itself. Neither nucleotides nor amino acids nor any 
other carbon-chain molecule is alive – yet put them together in the right way, and the dynamic 
that emerges out of their interactions is what we call life. It is effects, not things, upon which 
life is based – life is a kind of behaviour, not a kind of stuff – and as such, it is constituted of 
simpler behaviours, not simpler stuff. Behaviours themselves can constitute the fundamental 
parts of non-linear systems – virtual parts, which depend on non-linear interactions between 
physical parts for their very existence. Isolate the physical parts and the virtual parts cease to 
exist. It is the virtual parts of living systems that Artificial Life is after, and synthesis is its 
primary methodological tool. 
Artificial life, is attempting to develop a new computational paradigm based on the 
natural processes that support living organisms. That is, aLife uses insights from biology to 
explore the dynamics of interacting information structures, that is, aiming to know what key 
aspects exist in this information relations that can evolve the whole process. Artificial Life 
has not adopted the computational paradigm (limited as a technology of computation, as a 
sequence of orders) as its underlying and primary methodology of behaviour generation, nor 
does it attempt to explain life, or any other natural phenomena, as a kind of computer 
program. Computers are providing an alternative medium within which to attempt to 
synthesize life. Modern computer technology has resulted in machinery with tremendous 
potential for the creation of life in silico, and by far more important, a medium to understand 
how real life and nature are. Needless to say that, the present common fear of AI is 
proportional to his ignorance, as was true for many tools found useful in this century. As 
pointed by James Martin (the one that forecast the Wired Society back in 1977, while Bill 
Gates still banged out business correspondence on a typewriter): “People think that when 
computers become intelligent they will become intelligent like we are. Nothing could be more 
far from truth”. Nevertheless, some common underlying features could be found, which 
seems to be pertinent in the study and understanding of any system (natural or artificial), 
independently of his type of support.  
Computers, instead, provide (and should be viewed as) as an important laboratory 
tool for the study of life and many natural phenomena, as an alternative devoted exclusively 
to the incubation of information structures. The advantage of working with information 
structures is that information has no intrinsic size. The computer is the tool for the 
manipulation of information, whether that manipulation is a consequence of our actions or a 
consequence of the actions of the information structure themselves. Computers themselves 
will not be alive, rather they will support informational universes within which dynamic 
populations of informational ‘molecules’ (or memes, as proposed by Dawkins, as the cultural 
information genes, or vehicle, within one specific society) engage in informational 
‘biochemistry’. This view of computers as workstations for performing scientific experiments 
within artificial universes is fairly new, but is rapidly becoming accepted as a legitimate, even 
necessary, way of pursuing science. In the days before computers, scientists worked primarily 
with systems whose defining equations could be solved analytically, and ignored those whose 
defining equations could not be solved. This was the case, for instance, in many analytical 
systems trying to explain how the global weather changes, or trying to forecast the behaviour 
of a fire propagating in a specific terrain. As we now know, global weather is a chaotic non-
linear system, where a flap of a butterfly wing in Peking can develop a huge storm in New-
York, few days later. In the absence of analytical possible solutions, the equations would have 
to be integrated over and over again, essentially simulating the time behaviour of the system. 
Without computers to handle the mundane details of these calculations, such an undertaking 
was unthinkable except for the simplest cases. Given this mundane calculations to computers, 
the realm of numerical simulation is opened up for exploration. ‘Exploration’ is an 
appropriate term for the process, because the numerical simulation of systems allows one to 
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explore the system’s behaviour under a wide range of parameter settings and initial 
conditions.  
The heuristic value of this experimentation cannot be overestimated. One often gains 
tremendous insight for the essential dynamics of a system by observing its behaviour under a 
wide range of initial conditions. Moreover, computers are beginning to provide scientists with 
a new paradigm for modeling the world. When dealing with essentially unsolvable governing 
equations, the primary reason for producing a formal mathematical model (the hope of 
reaching an analytic solution by symbolic manipulation) is lost. It has become possible, for 
example, to model turbulent flow in a fluid by simulating the motions of its constituent 
particles – not just approximating changes in concentrations of particles at particular points, 
but actually computing their motions exactly. The same is true for understanding and 
modeling people in overcrowded soccer stadiums, or for instance, in gaining insight on how 
traffic jams emerge, from very simple inner rules. Again, the best way to tackle it, is to look 
at the whole process (as within a helicopter !), synthesizing which basic and simple logical 
rules (generally independent from the phenomena itself) govern the multitude of parts, 
emerging a global and complex behaviour. What is essential in these type of systems, is not 
the parts and their intrinsic natures (at least strictly), but namely their relationships (among 
themselves and with their environment). 
Within this same context, let us return again to genotype/phenotype distinction and on 
the possibility of the development of a behavioural phenotype. One paradigmatic model is the 
one of Craig Reynolds, who in 1987  has implemented a simulation of flocking behaviour. 
Now, if we think for a moment, none type of analytical differential equations was been able to 
tackle (or model) this type of natural phenomena. In the Reynolds model, however – which is 
meant to be a general platform for studying the qualitatively similar phenomena of flocking, 
herding and schooling – one has a large collection of autonomous but interacting objects 
(which Reynolds refer as Boids), inhabiting a common simulated environment. 
The modeler can specify the manner in which the individual Boids will respond to 
local events or conditions. The global behaviour of the aggregate of Boids is strictly an 
emergent phenomena, where none of the rules for the individual Boids depends on global 
information, and the only updating of the global state is done on the basis of individual Boids 
responding to local conditions. Note that, the underlying system nature is similar in many 
ways to a Cellular Automata, mentioned earlier. Again, each Boid (cell for the CA) in the 
aggregate shares the same behavioural ‘tendencies’: 
 
·To maintain a minimum distance from other objects in the environment, including other 
Boids, 
·To match velocities with Boids in its neighbourhood, and 
·To move towards the perceived centre of mass of the Boids in its neighbourhood. 
 
These are the only rules governing the behaviour of the aggregate. These rules, then, 
constitute the generalized genotype of the Boids system. What is amazing, is that they say 
nothing about structure, or growth and development, or even about birds nature, but they 
determine the behaviour of a set of interacting autonomous objects, out of which very natural 
motion emerges. 
 With the right settings for the parameters of the system, a collection of Boids released 
at random positions within a volume will collect into a dynamic flock, which flies around 
environmental obstacles in a very fluid and natural manner, occasionally breaking up into 
sub-flocks as the flock flows around both sides of an obstacle. Once broken up into sub-
flocks, the sub-flocks reorganize around their own, now distinct and isolated centre of mass, 
only to re-emerge into a single flock again when both (or more) sub-flocks emerge at the fair 
side of the obstacle and each sub-flock feels anew the mass of the other sub-flock. 
 The flocking behaviour itself constitutes the generalized phenotype of the Boids 
system. It bears the same relation to the genotype as an organism’s morphological phenotype 
bears to its molecular genotype. The same distinction, between the specification of machinery 
and the behaviour of machinery is evident. Through development (or time), local rules 
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governing simple non-linear interactions at the lowest level of complexity, emerge global 
behaviours and structures at the highest level of complexity. Finally, Artificial Life (as a truly 
interdisciplinary scientific field) may be viewed as an attempt to understand high-level 
behaviour from low-level rules, for example, on how the simple interactions between ants and 
their environment lead to complex trail-following behaviour. But by far more important than 
studying ants itself, is to study how they organize themselves, through out a simple adaptive 
mechanism that seems to be present in many natural phenomena of our world. An 
understanding of such relationships in particular systems can suggest novel solutions to 
complex real-world problems such as disease prevention, pattern recognition, stock-market 
prediction, or data mining on the Internet (to name up a few). 
Other similar scientific models and ideas, can be found in Natural Self-organising 
systems (Bilchev). A great majority of natural and artificial systems are of complex nature, 
and scientists choose more often than not to work on systems simplified to a minimum 
number of components in order to observe pure effects. An alternative approach, often known 
as the complex systems dynamics approach (Weisbuch), is to simplify as much as possible the 
components of the system, so as to take into account their large number. This idea has 
emerged from a recent trend in research known as the physics of disordered systems, but can 
also be found earlier in many aLife models (mentioned above) that follow bottom-up 
approaches. As suggested by Langton, the key concept in aLife is emergent behaviour. 
Natural life emerges out of the organised interactions of a great number of nonliving 
molecules, with no global controller responsible for the behaviour of every part. Rather, every 
part is a behaviour itself, and life is the behaviour that emerges from out of all of the local 
interactions among individual behaviours. It is this bottom-up, distributed local determination 
that aLife employs in its primary methodological approach to the generation of lifelike 
behaviours. Again, this seems to happen in real systems like our own brain; in rapid 
succession, research has revealed that the brain uses discrete systems for different types of 
learning (Damásio). 
Complex dynamic systems in general show interesting and desirable behaviours as 
flexibility (in vision or speech understanding tasks, the brain is able to cope with incorrect, 
ambiguous or distorted information, or even to deal with unforeseen or new situations without 
showing abrupt performance breakdown) or versatibility quoting Dorigo and Colorni, 
robustness (keep functioning even when some parts are locally damaged - Damásio), and they 
operate in a massively parallel fashion. As we know, systems of this kind abound in nature. A 
vivid example is provided by the behaviour of a society of termites (Courtouis). And, as a key 
feature, complex dynamical systems show and provide emergent properties. Again, this means 
that the behaviour of the system as a whole can no longer be viewed as a simple superposition 
of the individual behaviours of its elements, but rather as a side effect of their collective 
behaviour. Contained in this notion is the idea that properties are not a priory predictable 
from the structure of the local interactions and that they are of functional significance. The 
computation to be performed is contained in the dynamics of the system, which in turn is 
determined by the nature of the local interactions between the many elements.  
Many of the dynamical computation systems that have been developed today find 
their equivalent in nature, and all of them shows, directly or not, important emergent 
properties (among other lifelike features). A non-extensive list of possible paradigmatic 
examples include, Genetic Algorithms, Memetic Algorithms, Spin Glass Models, 
Connectionist Architectures and Artificial Neural Networks, Reaction-Diffusion systems, Self-
Organizing Maps, Simulated Annealing methods, Artificial Imunne systems, Cellular 
Automata, L-Systems, Gradient Vector Flow and Snakes, Differential Evolution, 
Correlational Opponent Processing and Particle Swarm Optimization. As an example, 
biological metaphors offer insight into many aspects of computer viruses and can inspire 
defenses against them. That is the case with some applications of Immunological 
Computation, and Artificial Immune Systems. The immune system is highly distributed, 
highly adaptive, maintains a memory of past encounters, is self-organising in nature and has 
the ability to continually learn about new encounters. From a computational viewpoint, the 
immune system has much to offer by way of inspiration. Detection of specific patterns in 
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large databases is one possible application. Autonomous alert collision systems, in route 
management for airplanes is another. 
Evolutionary computation is another example. In the spirit of Von Neumann, John 
Holland has attempted to abstract the logical form of the natural process of biological 
evolution in what is currently known as the Genetic Algorithm (GA). In the GA, a genotype is 
represented as a character string that encodes a potential solution to a problem. For instance, 
the character string (chromosome) might encode the weight matrix of a neural network, or the 
rule table of any Cellular Automata. These character strings are rendered as phenotypes via a 
problem-specific interpreter, which constructs, for example, the artificial neural network or 
the cellular automata machine specified by each genotype, evaluates its performance in the 
problem domain, and provides it with a specific fitness value. From this point the GA 
implements natural selection by making more copies of the character strings representing the 
better performing phenotypes. The GA generates variant genotypes by applying genetic 
operators to these character strings. The genetic operators typically consist of reproduction, 
cross-over, and mutation, with occasional usage of inversion and duplication. What is 
interesting is that “poor” individuals along several generations, often encode in parts of their 
genotypes, the key for the best solutions (artificial individuals) to become better. The best GA 
solution, is in some sense a product of the GA collective change of information, a product of 
the whole, being diversity a key aspect in the process, and a way for the artificial algorithm to 
balance his own exploration/exploitation duality character on the fitness landscape (space of 
possible solutions). Such evolutionary approaches are being applied to tasks such as 
optimisation, search procedures, classification, adaptation, among others. 
Yet, another prominent example, are Artificial Ant Systems. In “Godel, Escher, 
Bach”, Douglas Hofstadter explores the difference between an ant colony as a whole and the 
individual that compose it. According to Hofstadter, the behaviour of the whole colony is far 
more sophisticated and of very different character than the behaviour of the individual ants. A 
colony’s collective behaviour exceeds the sum of its individual member’s actions (so-called 
emergence) and is most easily observed when studying their foraging activity. Most species 
of ants forage collectively using chemical recruitment strategies, designated by pheromone 
trails, to lead their fellow nest-mates to food sources.  
This analogy with the way that real and natural ant colonies work and migrate, has 
suggested the definition in 1991/92 of a new computational paradigm, which is called the Ant 
System (Dorigo / Colorni). In these studies (again) there is no pre-commitment to any 
particular representational scheme: the desired behaviour is specified, but there is minimal 
specification of the mechanism required to generate that behaviour, i.e. global behaviour 
evolves from the many relations of multiple simple behaviours. Since then several studies 
were conducted to apply this recent paradigm – or analogous ones - in real case problems, 
with successful results. The new heuristic has the following desirable characteristics: (1) It is 
versatile, in that it can be applied to similar versions of the same problem; (2) It is Robust. It 
can be applied with only minimal changes to other problems (e.g. combinatorial optimisation 
problems such as the quadratic assignment problem - QAP, travelling salesman problem - 
TSP, or the job-shop scheduling problem - JSP);…and (3) It is a population based approach. 
This last property is interesting since it allows the exploitation of positive feedback as a 
search mechanism (the collective behaviour that emerges is a form of autocatalytic “snow 
ball” - that reinforces itself - behaviour, where the more the ants follow a trail, the more 
attractive that trail becomes for being followed). It also makes the system amenable to parallel 
implementations (though, only the intrinsically parallel and distributed nature of these 
systems are generally considered). 
An important feature in many of these dynamical computational systems is that of 
interaction (e.g. competition-cooperation duality). Cooperation involves a collection of agents 
– global behaviours, if we strictly follow Langton words - that interact by communicating 
information, or hints (usually concerning regions to avoid or likely to contain solutions) to 
each other while solving a problem. This duality interaction can also be found in the well 
known Prisoner Dilemma benchmark problem, used in many Evolutionary Algorithms 
including Genetic Algorithms. The information exchanged may be incorrect at times and 
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should alter the behaviour of the agents receiving it. Another example of cooperative problem 
solving is the use of the Genetic Algorithm to find states of high fitness in some abstract 
space. In a Genetic Algorithm, members of a population of states exchange pieces of 
themselves or mutate to create new populations, often containing states of higher fitness. And 
yet another example are Neural Networks, where the output of one neuron affects the 
behaviour (or state – under the light of Cellular Automata theory) of the neuron receiving it, 
and so on. Reporting to the real nature and quoting Damásio, we are barely beginning to 
address the fact that interactions among many non-contiguous brain regions probably yield 
highly complex biological states that are vastly more than the sum of their parts. It is 
important, however, to point out that the brain and mind are not a monolith: they have 
multiple structural levels, and the highest of those levels creates instruments that permit the 
observation of the other levels. 
On the other hand, it has become widely recognized that the past symbol-oriented 
community in AI only supported models in research that were far too rigid and specialized, 
focussing on well-defined problems that generally are rare to found in the real-world, that is, 
being too inflexible to function well outside the domains for which they were designed. Thus, 
they are often unable to deal with exceptions to rules, or to exploit fuzzy, approximate, or 
heuristic fragments of knowledge. We now know, that many of the “toy” problems of the 
past, has become the most difficult ones. Learning, recognition, adaptation, perception, visual 
capabilities in general, are among such examples. However, connectionist systems (the 
symbolic AI counterpart) seems to be in the right way, exploring the relations and capabilities 
among many simple parts, into the emergence of what we experience as a coherent and 
cognitive whole. 
One paradigmatic case is that of perception. Ramos (CVRM / IST – Technical 
University of Lisbon) explored the application of Artificial Ant Systems into Pattern 
Recognition problems, namely to the sub-problem of image segmentation, i.e., to find 
homogeneous regions in any digital image, in order to extract and classify them. The 
application of these heuristics onto image segmentation looks very promising, since 
segmentation can be looked as a clustering and combinatorial problem, and the grey level 
image itself as a topographic map (where the image is the ant colony playground).  
The distribution of the pheromone (a volatile and chemical substance) represents the 
memory of the recent history of the swarm, and in a sense it contain information which the 
individual ants are unable to hold or transmit. In this artificial system, there is no direct 
communication between the organisms but a type of indirect communication through the 
pheromonal field. In fact, ants are not allowed to have any memory and the individual’s 
spatial knowledge is restricted to local information about the whole colony pheromone 
density. Particularly interesting for the present task, i.e. trying to evolve perceptive 
capabilities, the self-organisation of ants into a swarm and the self-organisation of neurones 
into a brain-like structure are similar in many respects (Chialvo, Millonas). Swarms of social 
insects construct trails and networks of regular traffic via a process of pheromone laying and 
following. These patterns constitute what is known in brain science as a cognitive map. The 
main differences lies in the fact that insects write their spatial memories in the environment, 
while the mammalian cognitive map lies inside the brain, a fact that also constitutes an 
important advantage in the present model. As mentioned by Chialvo, this analogy can be 
more than a poetic image, and can be further justified by a direct comparison with the neural 
processes associated with the construction of cognitive maps in the hippocampus. Wilson, for 
instance, forecasted the eventual appearance of what he called “a stochastic theory of mass 
behaviour” and asserted that “the reconstruction of mass behaviours from the behaviours of 
single colony members is the central problem of insect sociobiology”. He forecasted that our 
understanding of individual insect behaviour together with the sophistication with which we 
will able to analyse their collective interaction would advance to the point were we would one 
day posses a detailed, even quantitative, understanding of how individual “probability 
matrices” would lead to mass action at the level of the colony. By replacing colony members 
with neurones, mass behaviours or colony by brain behaviour, and insect sociobiology with 
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brain science the above paragraph could describe the paradigm shifts in the last twenty-five 
years of progress in the brain sciences. 
Also a key issue is that, perception itself, as a human feature is being modelled and 
analysed by Gestalt psychology and philosophical systems since, at least 1910 (Wertheimer). 
It is of much interest to follow that this kind of scientific works point out that perception is a 
product of a synergistic whole effect, i.e. the effect of perception is generated not so much by 
its individual elements (e.g. human neurones) as by their dynamic interrelation (collective 
behaviour) – phenomena that can be found easily in many computational paradigms briefly 
described above, or even in Neural Network computational models, where data generalisation, 
N dimensional matrix re-mapping, pattern classification or forecasting abilities are known to 
be possible. As putted by Limin Fu in his own words, the intelligence of a Neural Network 
emerges from the collective behaviour of neurones, each of which performs only very limited 
operations. Even though each individual neuron works slowly, they can still quickly find a 
solution by working in parallel. This fact can explain why humans can recognize a visual 
scene faster than a digital computer, while an individual brain cell responds much more 
slowly than a digital cell in a VLSI (Very Large Scale Integration) circuit. Also, this brain 
metaphor suggests how to build an intelligent system which can tolerate faults (fault 
tolerance) by distributing information redundantly. It would be easier to build a large system 
in which most of the components work correctly than to build a smaller system in which all 
components are perfect. Another feature exhibited by the brain is the associative type of 
memory. The brain naturally associates one thing with another. It can access information 
based on contents rather than on sequential addresses as in the normal digital computer. The 
associative, or content-addressable, memory accounts for fast information retrieval and 
permits partial or approximate matching. The brain seems to be good at managing fuzzy 
information because of the way its knowledge is represented. 
Typically these systems form a structure, configuration, or pattern of physical, 
biological, sociological, or psychological phenomena, so integrated as to constitute a 
functional unit with properties not derivable from its parts in summation (i.e. non-linear) – 
Gestalt in one word (Krippendorff) (the English word more similar is perhaps system, 
configuration or whole). This synergetic view, derives from the holistic conviction that the 
whole is more than the sum of its parts and, since the energy in a whole cannot exceed the 
sum of the energies invested in each of its parts (e.g. first law of thermodynamics), that there 
must therefore be some quantity with respect to which the whole differs from the mere 
aggregate. This quantity is called synergy and in many aLife computational systems can be 
seen as their inherent emergent and autocatalytic properties (process well known in many 
Reinforcement Learning models, namely in Q-learning methods often used in autonomous-
agents design (Mitchell / Maes).  
Part of what we know see in the MC2 UTOPIA Biennial Art Exposition, was due to a 
model that has explored the application of these features into digital images, replacing the 
normal colony habitat, by grey levels, extending the capabilities of pheromone deposition 
into different situations, allowing a process of perceptual morphogenesis. In other words, 
from local and simple interactions to global and flexible adaptive perception. In those 
experiments, the emergence of network pheromone trails, for instance, are the product of 
several simple and local interactions that can evolve to complex patterns, which in some sense 
translate a meta-behaviour of that swarm. Moreover, the translation of one kind of low-level 
structure of information (present in a large number) to one meta-level is minimal. Although 
that behaviour is specified (and somehow constrained), there is minimal specification of the 
mechanism required to generate that behaviour; global behaviour evolves from the many 
relations of multiple simple behaviours, without global coordination, and using indirect 
communication (through the environment). One paradigmatic and abstract example is the 
notion, within a specified population, of common-sense, being the meta-result a type of 
collective-conscience. Needless to say, that some features are acquired (through out the 
evolving relation with the habitat), being others inner components of each part. Though, what 
is interesting to note is that we do not need to specify them. Moreover, the present model 
shows important adaptive capabilities, as in the presence of sudden changes in the habitat. 
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Even if the model is able to quickly adapts to one specific environment, evolving from one 
empty pheromonal field, habitat transitions point that, the whole system is able to have some 
memory from past environments (i.e. convergence is more difficult after learning and 
perceiving one habitat). This emerged feature of résistance, is somewhat present in many of 
the natural phenomena that we find today in our society.  
 Another common feature found in many of these computational paradigms, is that of 
synergy. Synergy (from the Greek word synergos), broadly defined, refers to combined or co-
operative effects produced by two or more elements (parts or individuals). The definition is 
often associated with the quote “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (Aristotle, in 
Metaphysics), even if it is more accurate to say that the functional effects produced by wholes 
are different from what the parts can produce alone. Synergy is a ubiquitous phenomena in 
nature and human societies alike. One well know example is provided by the emergence of 
self-organization in social insects, via direct (mandibular, antennation, chemical or visual 
contact, etc) or indirect interactions. The latter types are more subtle and defined by Grassé as 
stigmergy to explain task coordination and regulation in the context of nest reconstruction in 
Macrotermes termites. An example, could be provided by two individuals, who interact 
indirectly when one of them modifies the environment and the other responds to the new 
environment at a later time. In other words, stigmergy could be defined as a typical case of 
environmental synergy. Grassé showed that the coordination and regulation of building 
activities do not depend on the workers themselves but are mainly achieved by the nest 
structure: a stimulating configuration triggers the response of a termite worker, transforming 
the configuration into another configuration that may trigger in turn another (possibly 
different) action performed by the same termite or any other worker in the colony. Another 
illustration of how stimergy and self-organization can be combined into more subtle adaptive 
behaviors is recruitment in social insects. Self-organized trail laying by individual ants is a 
way of modifying the environment to communicate with nest mates that follow such trails. It 
appears that task performance by some workers decreases the need for more task 
performance: for instance, nest cleaning by some workers reduces the need for nest cleaning. 
Therefore, nest mates communicate to other nest mates by modifying the environment 
(cleaning the nest), and nest mates respond to the modified environment (by not engaging in 
nest cleaning); that is stigmergy. 
In other words, perception and action only by themselves can evolve adaptive and 
flexible problem-solving mechanisms, or emerge communication among many parts. The 
whole and their relationships (that is, the next layer in complexity) emerges from the 
relationship of many parts, even if these latter are acting strictly within and according to any 
sub-level of basic and simple strategies, ad-infinitum repeated. Quoting Einstein, the system 
“should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler”. Division of labor is another 
paradigmatic phenomena of stigmergy. Simultaneous task performance (parallelism) by 
specialized workers is believed to be more efficient than sequential task performance by 
unspecialized workers. Parallelism avoids task switching, which costs energy and time. A key 
feature of division of labor is its plasticity. Division of labor is rarely rigid. The ratios of 
workers performing the different tasks that maintain the colony’s viability and reproductive 
success can vary in response to internal perturbations or external challenges.  
But by far more crucial to the design of any “Machine of Collective Conscience”, is 
how ants form piles of items such as dead bodies (corpses), larvae, or grains of sand. There 
again, stigmergy is at work: ants deposit items at initially random locations. When other ants 
perceive deposited items, they are stimulated to deposit items next to them, being this type of 
cemetery clustering organization and brood sorting a type of self-organization and adaptive 
behavior. Théraulaz and Bonabeau described for instance, a model of nest building in wasps, 
in which wasp-like agents are stimulated to deposit bricks when they encounter specific 
configurations of bricks: depositing a brick modifies the environment and hence the 
stimulatory field of other agents. These asynchronous automata (designed by an ensemble of 
algorithms) move in a 3D discrete space and behave locally in space and time on a pure 
stimulus-response basis. There are other types of examples (e.g. prey collectively transport), 
yet stimergy is also present: ants change the perceived environment of other ants (their 
 12
cognitive map, according to Chialvo and Millonas), and in every example, the environment 
serves as medium of communication.  
What all these examples have in common is that they show how stigmergy can easily 
be made operational. As mentioned by Bonabeau, that is a promising first step to design 
groups of artificial agents which solve problems: replacing coordination (and possible some 
hierarchy) through direct communications by indirect interactions is appealing if one wishes 
to design simple agents and reduce communication among agents. Another feature shared by 
several of the examples is incremental construction: for instance, termites make use of what 
other termites have constructed to contribute their own piece. In the context of optimization 
(though not used directly on the present work), incremental improvement is widely used: a 
new solution is constructed from previous solutions (see ACO paradigm, Dorigo et al). 
Finally, stigmergy is often associated with flexibility: when the environment changes because 
of an external perturbation, the insects respond appropriately to that perturbation, as if it were 
a modification of the environment caused by the colony’s activities. In other words, the 
colony can collectively respond to the perturbation with individuals exhibiting the same 
behavior. When it comes to artificial agents, this type of flexibility is priceless: it means that 
the agents can respond to a perturbation without being reprogrammed to deal with that 
particular instability. If we wish, for instance, to design a data mining classification system, 
this means that no classifier re-training is needed for any new sets of data-item types (new 
classes) arriving to the system, as is necessary in many classical models, or even in some 
recent ones. Moreover, the data-items that were used for supervised purposes in early stages 
in the colony evolution in his exploration of the search-space, can now, along with new items, 
be re-arranged in more optimal ways. Classification and/or data retrieval remains the same, 
but the system organizes itself in order to deal with new classes, or even new sub-classes. 
This task can be performed in real time, and in robust ways due to system’s redundancy. 
Many experiments are now under their way at the CVRM-IST Lab (for instance, real-time 
marble and granite image classification, image and data retrieval, etc), along with the 
application of Genetic Algorithms, Neural Networks, and many others (based strictly on 
natural computation paradigms) to many problems in Natural Resources Management like 
forecasting water quality and control on river networks. 
Recently, several scientific papers have highlighted the efficiency of stochastic 
approaches based on ant colonies for problem solving. This concerns for instance 
combinatorial optimization problems like the Traveling Salesman problem, the Quadratic 
Assignment problem, Routing problems, the Bin Packing problem, or Time Tabling 
scheduling problems. Numerical optimization problems have been tackled also with artificial 
ants, as well as Robotics.  
Data and information clustering is also one of those problems in which real ants can 
suggest very interesting heuristics for computer scientists, and it is in fact a classic strategy 
often used in Image and Signal Processing. Examples can be found using for instance the 
classic K-Means Clustering model, or in extensions of it as in the well know ISODATA, or 
even with other hybrid and more recent approaches using Genetic Algorithms within image 
classification (Ramos). One of the first studies using the metaphor of ant colonies related to 
the above clustering domain is due to Deneubourg, where a population of ant-like agents 
randomly moving onto a 2D grid are allowed to move basic objects so as to cluster them. This 
method was then further generalized by Lumer and Faieta, applying it to exploratory data 
analysis, for the first time. In 1995, the two authors were then beyond the simple example, 
and applied their algorithm to interactive exploratory database analysis, where a human 
observer can probe the contents of each represented point (sample, image, item) and alter the 
characteristics of the clusters. They showed that their model provides a way of exploring 
complex information spaces, such as document or relational databases, because it allows 
information access based on exploration from various perspectives. However, this last work 
was never published due to commercial applications. 
 
Following the emergent features described above, the idea behind the MC2 Machine 
is simple to transpose for the first time,  the mammalian cognitive map, to a environmental 
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(spatial) one, allowing the recognition of what happens when a group of individuals (humans) 
try to organize different abstract concepts (words) in one habitat (via internet). Even if each of 
them is working alone in a particular sub-space of that “concept” habitat, simply rearranging 
notions at their own will, mapping  “Sameness” into “Neighbourness”, not recognizing the 
whole process occurring simultaneously on their society, a global collective-conscience 
emerges. Clusters of abstract notions emerge, exposing groups of similarity among the 
different concepts. The MC2 machine is then like a mirror of what happens inside the brain of 
multiple individuals trying to impose their own conscience onto the group.  
 
 
 
Take any swarm. Take any collective natural system, where many parts are present. 
Study it. Identify which rules are prominent at local neighbours. The simpler the 
better. Understand if they are similar in any other natural system. You will probably 
be astonished. Now, collect them together in any computer. Mix them. Play it and let 
them evolve by their own. Soon, you will perceive organization. Any type of 
organization. What you will see is nothing more than the decay of entropy. But, don’t 
stop it and feed the system with diversity. Re-inject knowledge if you think they will 
take profit of it. Memory among the whole is emerging. Even better than that: parts of 
the system at different locations can perceive the whole. Now, from time to time, 
allow the system to become slightly chaotic. Evaporation is one way. Oh, yes! 
Solutions found so far become more robust and flexible. Now, take this whole as a 
unit. And take any other whole. And another one. Take a lot of wholes and collect 
them in a computer, or in any other type of information structure. Put them in another 
layer of complexity. Mix them. Play it and let them evolve..., are you pleased?  
 
Take a swarm. Play it. Let them evolve trails of pheromone in any 2D grid. Now, 
replace the grid by any digital image. Use this image as the colony Habitat. As their 
playground. Wait. Be patient. Then, take that image and put another one. Have you 
seen what happened? They have some memory of the past, isn’t it?! Memory of 
what? Now take one map of pheromone at any time step. Use it, as it was any type 
of structure of information. Grab it. See it as the swarm cognitive map. Forget this 2D 
draw. Evolve the third dimension, that is, the frequency of pheromone at any cell of 
the Habitat. Join the edges, since they move in a toroidal space. Now, replay the 
system, seeing only this. Enjoy it! You are now in another layer of complexity. You 
are seeing the brain of the collective whole, evolving on time.  
 
Now, forget ants. Imagine a 2D environment, with many cells. Imagine that some 
cells have individuals. Human individuals. And, imagine that in some other cells, 
objects are present. These objects are letters. These objects can be moved by the 
individuals. Allow the system to have pheromone deposition. Allow also, evaporation 
from time to time. Launch this habitat and these possibilities onto any world web 
site,… and wait. If we free the system, letters will re-organize themselves onto words. 
Many words, in many languages. Words, then, will evolve into concepts. Concepts 
that reflect the common thought between all the virtual society. A society composed 
of many autonomous individuals, which in a non-hierarchical way emerge something 
that exceeds the simple summation of their positions, and trying to force their views. 
Can you imagine what type of cognitive map will appear? What is then, a pheromone 
trail, within this specific context? Have you imagined how useful this can be?!  
 
Through a Internet site reflecting the “words habitat”, the users (humans) choose, 
gather and reorganize some types of letters, words and concepts. The overall movements of 
these letter-objects are then mapped into a public space. Along this process, two shifts 
emerge: the virtual becomes the reality, and the personal subjective and disperse beliefs 
become onto a social and politically significant element.  
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The MC2 machine will reveal then what happens in many real world situations; 
cooperation among individuals, altruism, egoism, radicalism, and also the resistance to that 
radicalism, memory of that society on some extreme positions on time, but the inevitable 
disappearance of that positions, to give rise to the convergence to the group majority thought 
(Common-sense?), eliminating good or bad relations found so far, among in our case, words 
and abstract notions. Even though the machine composed of many human-parts will “work” 
within this restrict context, she will reveal how some relationships among notions in our 
society (ideas) are only possible to be found, when and only when, simple ones are found first 
(the minimum layer of complexity), neglecting possible big steps of a minority group of 
visionary individuals. What effect these local jumps of complexity have in the long run? And, 
if really the information process evolution of the system (giving jumps at several complexity 
levels) follows (from the inner basic to the global complex) the conceptual space of: Rules ?  
Relations ?  Behaviours;  what intermediate relations are really significant, allowing the 
system to emerge a coherent and cognitive Whole. Is there (in our society) any need for a 
critical mass of knowledge, in order to achieve other layers of complexity? Roughly, she will 
reveal for instance how democracies can evolve and die on time, as many things in our 
impermanent world.  
 We believe, that what we are showing here today at the UTOPIA Biennial Art 
Exposition, is a possible walk, up to Life-like Complexity and Behaviour, from bottom, basic 
and simple bio-inspired heuristics – a walk, up into the morphogenesis of information. We 
believe that these are the first steps into the design of truly collective, flexible, cognitive and 
adaptive forms of information structures, whatever they may be, or whatever they may 
represent, among many possible and specific contexts. From the construction of collective 
non-hierarchical and permanently evolving texts, to the emergence of self-organising and 
distributive Local Area Networks of concepts (through the use of flexible self-reinforcing 
links, as pheromone trails), applications are immense. Can we, for instance, induce new forms 
of Art?  
 
Finally, we would like to quote Pierre Lévy (in, World Philosophy, Éditions Jacob, 2000):  
 
[…] Institutions, States, Public Administrations, Universities, Museums, Enterprises, 
Associations, Groups of Interest, Individuals, all those neglecting the study towards the best 
way to introduce themselves in the processes of collective intelligence (that is, the social 
processes of interchange and knowledge production) and distributive ways of attention, that 
evolve under a planetary cyberspace, will miss the opportunity of achieving the slightest role 
on the world of the future […] 
 
